

Limits of Current Responses to Emerging Drone Threat

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In the recent decade, drones have emerged as the new go-to weapon by world militaries, which have been aiming to find ways to extend their ability to inflict damage on the enemy at a smaller cost. This trend has not been limited to world militaries, but has in recent years also grown in popularity among non-state actors, which have been aiming to find ways to inflict maximum damage on their counterparts, who have much greater funding and military capabilities. In this, military drones became a weapon of choice due to their low cost, ease of building, simple supply chain, as well as their ability to avoid radar detection. This paper will look at how significant this change has been in terrorist groups' military strategies, and what the global response has been to limit the proliferation of this technology, as well as to find ways to counter it.

The methodology that this research will adopt will be the case study structure, as it would allow a clear demonstration of the cases where this new trend of terrorism was used and what were the international responses against it. The research for this paper was mainly done through a mixture of news analysis, open-source intelligence gathering, as well as political report and literature analysis. This paper will define terrorist organizations according to the U.S. State Department's list of designated terrorist organizations. The case studies in this paper will examine the use of drones by Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iranian-aligned militia groups designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department.²

The region of focus of this paper will be limited to case studies in the Middle East, as defined in this paper, encompassing the region spanning from the Levant to the Arabian Peninsula, as defined by the UK Parliament.³ While, depending on the source, the region can include Sudan and Libya, regardless, this paper will not consider these options.

Drones in this paper will refer to military drones used by terrorist groups for the purposes of surveillance, suicide attacks, as well as direct strike capabilities. This paper will not refer to dual-use or fully civilian drones incorporated into the terrorist groups arsenal.

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² U.S. Department of State, "Terrorist Designations of Iran-Aligned Militia Groups," September 17, 2025, <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/terrorist-designations-of-iran-aligned-militia-groups>

³ UK Parliament. "Middle East (Definition) Volume 491: Debated on Wednesday 25 July 1951." Parliament.uk, 2025. [https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1951-07-25/debates/d6802de7-8449-49aa-b086-c5f6c34e453b/MiddleEast\(Definition\)](https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1951-07-25/debates/d6802de7-8449-49aa-b086-c5f6c34e453b/MiddleEast(Definition)).

Drones emerged as a game-changer in modern warfare. They first appeared during U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, showcasing sophisticated unmanned weapon systems, and were later popularized by global militaries that began producing lower-cost versions. This concept of cheaper aerial weapons capable of inflicting damage on far more expensive military assets was further demonstrated during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the 2020s and later in the Ukraine conflict.⁴ This trend was also followed by non-state actors, who began developing their own less sophisticated versions or importing the technologies from states that support their organizations.

One of the most successful weapon that these terrorist organisations managed to get a hold on might be the suicide drones. These loitering munitions, which are also called kamikaze drones, function as explosive UAVs that are designed to crash into targets with precision.⁵ Unlike traditional drones, they are single-use systems that allow the controller to maneuver in the air while at the same time delivering destructive power like missiles. This innovation represented a significant evolution in asymmetric warfare by terrorist organisations, allowing these actors to conduct precise strikes while maintaining deniability. The technology has become a hallmark of a number of group's warfare strategy, particularly visible in conflicts across the Middle East, where these drones have been used against both military and civilian targets.

One of the drivers of this technology's rise as the go-to weapon has been shown to be their considerably easier materials to transport discreetly compared to larger weapon systems. It is also important to take into account that, especially in the case of drones, many of the parts can be 3D printed, according to an interview with Tihama-based security officials.⁶ On the other hand, for classic weapon systems smuggling in most cases is the only way. Smuggling weapons to conflict zones, especially as a sanctioned state, has a few disadvantages. Firstly, smuggling is an expensive process. It costs money to pay intermediaries and smugglers, and regardless, there is a great risk of the weapons being discovered or caught before even getting to the intended location, making the investment a potential waste. Secondly, as the sponsors of terrorisms generally aim to have a possible deniability strategy regarding its relations and arms sales to the organisation. It is unbeneficial for the smuggled weapons to be found, which can be traced back to their source which can cause significant PR problems. The 3D printing technology allowed, instead of smuggling the whole weapon, the ability to use technology and design transfer for them to be locally mass-produced at a much cheaper cost. That might explain why many terrorist organisations use drones which most parts are commonly printed locally. However still in this strategy the source can be assumed as many locally printed drones show design similarities to the drones of their

⁴ Eado Hecht, "Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Analyzing the Data," *Military Strategy Magazine* 7, no. 4 (winter 2022): 31–37,

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/drones-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-analyzing-the-data/>,

Dominika Kunertova, "The War in Ukraine Shows the Game-Changing Effect of Drones Depends on the Game,"

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 2 (March 2023): 95–102, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178180>

⁵ MARSS, "What Are Kamikaze Drones?," accessed March 20, 2026,

<https://marss.com/about/news/what-are-kamikaze-drones/>

⁶ Michael Horton, "Looking West: The Houthis' Expanding Footprint in the Horn of Africa," *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, December 20, 2024,

<https://ctc.westpoint.edu/looking-west-the-houthis-expanding-footprint-in-the-horn-of-africa/>.

main source. For example while the Qasef-1, the so-called Houthi domestically produced drone, ended up with significant similarities in design to the Iranian Ababil-T suicide drone, showing the likelihood of design transfer.⁷

However, while the outside parts of drones can be produced or printed locally, the internal electronics still need to be supplied by foreign countries such as Iran. It is known that Iran has been supplying these because a letter given by a panel of experts to the UN Security Council president indicated findings that the internal electronics of the drone found are acquired from domestic Iranian suppliers and electronics manufacturers predominantly located in Asia.⁸

In this aspect the first aim of the international response to deter such drone terrorism could have been to cut the supply chain. However this has been significantly difficult due to many of the components used having dual commercial usages which makes it significantly complicated to differentiate the parts that are being brought in the country aimed for military purposes and for civilian use.⁹ Furthermore the lack of rule of law and oversight in the countries where conflict exists further complicates a collective international response to limit the proliferation of such weapon technologies.¹⁰

Usage of drones by terrorist organisations also brings another aspect of conflict: psychological warfare. For example during the period of high-intensity escalation between Hezbollah and Israel, Hezbollah actively used Iranian drones as an aspect of psychological intimidation.¹¹ This usage of intelligence and media for public communication to the Israeli media, aiming to create uncertainty and vulnerability, also helps the organisations prestige, as every drone that Hezbollah sends to Israel that manages to avoid interception by the Iron Dome helps the organisations deterrence aims by reminding the Israeli public of Iran's technological capability and that they can be targeted. Such an aspect also makes these weapons significantly damaging to the human well being in the conflict areas as it degrades public morale and presses further stress in the society.

⁷ Conflict Armament Research, Iranian Technology Transfers to Yemen (London: Conflict Armament Research Ltd., March 21, 2017),

<https://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Iranian-Technology-Transfers-to-Yemen.pdf>

⁸ United Nations Security Council, "Letter Dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Mandated by Security Council Resolution 2342 (2017) Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68) [EN/AR] - Yemen," ReliefWeb, February 14, 2018,

<https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/letter-dated-26-january-2018-panel-experts-yemen-mandated-security-council-resolution>.

⁹ Suat Cubukcu and Evan Jordan, "The Houthi Drone Supply Chain," Orion Policy Institute, July 26, 2025,

<https://orionpolicy.org/the-houthi-drone-supply-chain>

¹⁰ United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 27 January 2020 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2020/70) (New York: United Nations, January 27, 2020), page 3.

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2020_70.pdf

¹¹ Lina Khatib, "Israel and Hezbollah Are Destroying the Meaning of Red Lines," Chatham House, June 25, 2024,

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/06/israel-and-hezbollah-are-destroying-meaning-red-lines>.

Since October 7, Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq have systematically struck U.S. military bases using missiles and drones exported by Iran, carrying out 170 attacks in just eight months.¹² These precision strikes were not merely aimed at harassment but were more of a calculated demonstration of their ability to challenge American dominance by focusing on its technological limitations. Despite its undeniably overwhelming firepower, the U.S. has shown the world that it is unable to defend itself against a continuous barrage of Iranian drones and missiles. This showed that, regardless of its strong stance in the diplomatic field, the U.S. has significant vulnerabilities in its regional presence. The Biden administration's retaliation against these proxy positions in Iraq came only as a reaction to the death of three U.S. soldiers in a drone attack.¹³ This created the perception that the U.S. is not in control but is merely reacting to regional developments. Even when the U.S. strikes came into action, they failed to restore its vanished deterrence, with Iran simply dialing back attacks temporarily without paying any significant price for its actions.¹⁴ This period left 45 American personnel wounded and 3 dead, showing how Iran can inflict physical harm without taking any responsibility.¹⁵ These attacks revealed a stark reality that many in the strategic decision-making circles of the White House would find troubling: that Iran, using these proxies armed with its drones, had successfully challenged U.S. military superiority in the region, turning Washington's once-unquestioned hegemony into a liability.

Similarly, these proxies also continuously attacked Israeli bases using missiles and drones, with attack claims increasing from only 6 times in August 2024 to 111 times in October 2024, regardless of many failing to reach Israel itself.¹⁶ While it could be argued that there is some autonomy in these attacks, as the groups have repeatedly stated that they are attacking to pressure Israel to end its war in Gaza, the fact that Iran is arming them creates their attack capabilities, which ultimately serve Iranian regional interests. While there have been some reports published in Reuters on April 7, 2025, arguing that there was significant pressure from Washington for the disarming of these Iran-linked militia groups, this argument was quickly denied by the leaders of these organizations.¹⁷

¹² Lara Seligman, "Iran Proxy Attacks on US Troops in Iraq, Syria Drop off as Red Sea Heats Up," POLITICO, March 6, 2024, <https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/06/proxy-attacks-iraq-syria-red-sea-00145428>.

¹³ Natasha Bertrand Liebermann and Haley Britzky, "US Launches Retaliatory Strikes on Iranian-Linked Militia Targets in Iraq and Syria," CNN, February 2, 2024, <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/02/politics/us-strikes-iraq-syria/index.html>.

¹⁴ Farnaz Fassihi, Eric Schmitt, and Julian E. Barnes, "After U.S. Strikes, Iran's Proxies Scale Back Attacks on American Bases," The New York Times, February 27, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html>.

¹⁵ Courtney Kube, "At Least 45 U.S. Service Members May Have Been Injured in Iran-Linked Attacks," NBC News, 2023, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/40-us-service-members-may-brain-injuries-iran-linked-attacks-rcna123591>.

¹⁶ Michael Knights, Amir al-Kaabi, and Hamdi Malik, "Tracking Anti-U.S. And Anti-Israel Strikes from Iraq and Syria during the Gaza Crisis," The Washington Institute, November 3, 2024, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis>.

¹⁷ Reagan Easter, "Iraq's Kataib Hezbollah Militia Denies Report It Will Disarm," FDD, April 8, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_ed/2025/04/08/iraqs-kataib-hezbollah-militia-denies-report-it-will-disarm/, Ahmed Rasheed, "Exclusive: Iran-Backed Militias in Iraq Ready to Disarm to Avert Trump Wrath," Reuters, April 8,

Hezbollah is also considered a terrorist organization that has effectively employed drones to achieve its military objectives. While the exact number of UAVs in their arsenal remains unknown, estimates suggest they possess several thousand¹⁸ The increased accessibility and tactical advantages of unmanned systems make it reasonable to presume Hezbollah's current drone capabilities far exceed earlier assessments. We also have statistics showing that drone attacks from Hezbollah to Israel during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2024 had a considerably low interception rate due to their ability to fly while avoiding the Israeli air defences radar systems. The IDF report shows an estimated 70–80% success rate in intercepting against the October 2024 attacks from Lebanon.¹⁹

Another one of the successful cases of terrorist groups using drones for their interest was the usage of drones by the Houthis. Initially involved in a domestic insurgency against Yemeni authorities and Saudi-led coalitions since the 1990s, the Houthi movement saw a boost in Iranian military aid from 2015 onwards.²⁰ This escalated assistance was mainly through the provision of sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These transfers significantly augmented the group's capacity to conduct operations beyond its historical scope, giving it significant long-distance strike capabilities that allowed the Houthis to inflict significant damage on Saudi Arabia.²¹ This strategy of attacking with drones, causing further damage to Saudi civilian and economic locations, resulted in the 2023 ceasefire in the Yemen civil war considerably in favour of the organisation.²² While after the ceasefire between the Saudis there was a significant reduction in Houthi activity, in more recent years after the start of the Gaza conflict on October 7, the Houthis began using drones to disrupt the region. The Gaza conflict allowed political bases for Houthi actions which were aimed to advance their own wider strategic objectives. With a growing technical support and weaponry from countries like Iran, the group started focusing on attacking Israeli targets and international shipping routes, basing these actions on their

2025,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-backed-militias-iraq-ready-disarm-avert-trump-wrath-2025-04-07/>.

¹⁸ Tal Beeri, "Hezbollah's UAV Array: Its Transformation from a Potential Strategic Threat to a Actual Strategic Threat," Alma Research and Education Center, June 11, 2025,

<https://israel-alma.org/hezbollahs-uav-array-its-transformation-from-a-potential-strategic-threat-to-a-actual-strategic-threat/>

¹⁹ Yonah Jeremy Bob, "IDF Investigates Hezbollah Drone Interception Failure," The Jerusalem Post, October 14, 2024, <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-824560>.

²⁰ Cameron Glenn, Nada Ghorab, and Matthew Rowan, "Who Are Yemen's Houthis?" (Wilson Center, 2022), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis>.

²¹ Seth Jones, Jared Thompson, Danielle Ngo, Joseph Bermudez, and Brian McSorley, "The Iranian and Houthi War against Saudi Arabia," Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 21, 2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia>, 2.

²² Parisa Hafezi, Nayera Abdallah, and Aziz El Yaakoubi, "Iran and Saudi Arabia Agree to Resume Ties after Years of Hostility," Reuters, March 10, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-saudi-arabia-agree-resume-ties-re-open-embassies-iranian-state-media-2023-03-10/>.

involvement in the Gaza hostilities.²³ In the years between 2024 and 2025, Houthi forces carried out 671 assaults on commercial and military vessels, alongside 57 strikes aimed at Israeli territory, all while using an inventory of Iranian-manufactured drones.²⁴ These operations allowed them to cause significant disruptions to global shipping in strategic water corridors such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Suez Canal. By December 2024, transit volume through these waterways had declined by 75%, a sharp increase from the 50% reduction documented seven months prior.²⁵ Iran's supply of precision-guided systems not only improved the group's tactical effectiveness but also allowed it to push its broader objective of exploiting regional instability to counter rival states and influence maritime security frameworks.

There have been some efforts to challenge these activities of Iran and its proxies in recent years. Operation Poseidon Archer, conducted by a coalition of U.S. and UK navies, launched over 530 airstrikes against Houthi military installations in 2024 to destroy this Iranian proxy infrastructure.^{26 27} After the Trump administration took over he decided to increase the pressure with extensive strikes aiming to deter the organisation while also degrading the group's military capacities. In this aim the US military carried out over 1,100 strikes with its Operation Rough Rider striking Houthi's weapon factories, military facilities and weapon storage depots.²⁸ The UK again became the only country to also join these strikes from 30th of April with the British Defence Minister John Healey referring to their operation as the British response to the persistent threat to freedom of navigation.²⁹ According to the British government the attacks destroyed numerous drone manufacturing and storage sites.³⁰ While these operations killed a number of high-ranking

²³ Al Jazeera, "Yemen's Houthis 'Will Not Stop' Red Sea Attacks until Israel Ends Gaza War," December 19, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/19/yemens-houthis-will-not-stop-red-sea-attacks-until-israel-stops-gaza-war>

²⁴ Ari Cicurel, "Israel-Houthi Escalation Projectile Tracker: 1/3/25 Update," March 1, 2025, <https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Israel-Houthi-Escalation-Projectile-Tracker-1-3-25-2.pdf>, pp.4-5

²⁵ World Bank, The Deepening Red Sea Shipping Crisis: Impacts and Outlook, MENA FCV Economic Series Brief, no. 2 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025), p.2 <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/42787>.

²⁶ Jim Garamone, "U.S., U.K. Launch Strikes against Houthi Targets in Yemen to Protect Red Sea Shipping," U.S. Department of Defense, February 4, 2024, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3665898/us-uk-launch-strikes-against-houthi-targets-in-yemen-to-protect-red-sea-shipping/>.

²⁷ Ari Cicurel, Israel-Houthi Escalation Projectile Tracker: 1/3/25 Update (Jewish Institute for National Security of America, January 3, 2025), <https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Israel-Houthi-Escalation-Projectile-Tracker-1-3-25-2.pdf>, pp.5

²⁸ Gregory D. Johnsen, "Feature Commentary: An Assessment of Operation Rough Rider," CTC Sentinel 18, no. 6 (June 2025), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/CTC-SENTINEL-062025_cover-article.pdf

²⁹ Dan Sabbagh, "UK Launches Yemen Airstrikes, Joining US Campaign Against Houthi Rebels," The Guardian, April 30, 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/30/uk-yemen-airstrikes-houthi-rebels>

³⁰ "UK Joins Latest US Air Strikes in Yemen," Al Jazeera, April 30, 2025, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/30/uk-joins-latest-us-air-strikes-in>

Houthi officials and destroyed numerous military bases according to a publication by New York Times US Central Command believes that while the strikes caused some degradation of Houthi capability it is argued that the lost capacity could be easily restored.³¹ According to a UN Panel of Experts on Yemen report, after the US strikes Houthies maintained their drone launch capabilities and increased their weapon procurement and smuggling activities which strengthened their combat capabilities. Furthermore the report also referred to the seizure of 750 tons of illicit materiel and weapons by the Yemeni government which included drone components such as hardware pieces, warheads, thermal seekers, drone engines.³² This further proves that while the strikes may destroy the existing infrastructure due violations of the arms embargo continue to occur and the considerably simple put together of the drones allow the organisation to keep its military capability. Such examples show the limitations of air operations in countering such modern terror threats.

There were also some diplomatic measures taken including passing of a UN Security Council resolution denouncing the Houthi attacks and US re-designated the Houthis' as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity which did not show to have any effect on the organisation's actions.³³ In that respect the international cooperation also stayed limited with only a limited number of countries joining the US's naval operations against the Houthi threat which failed its main objective to deter the organisations actions disrupting the maritime trade.³⁴ One semi successful diplomatic win might be the May 2025 US-Houthi ceasefire agreement which limited Houthi strikes against US ships and global shipping. However this agreement, first did not include Israel, resulted with a continuation of drone attacks to Israel and Israeli ships as well as on a number of occasions also targeting Liberia and Netherlands flagged maritime vessels.³⁵ While the ceasefire reduced the organisation's global maritime attack statistics, it remained a threat to maritime trade,

³¹ Helene Cooper, Greg Jaffe, Jonathan Swan, Eric Schmitt, and Maggie Haberman, "Trump Says U.S. Will Stop Bombing Houthis After Rebels Say They'll Stop Targeting Ships," New York Times, May 12, 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/us/politics/trump-houthis-bombing.html>

³² United Nations Security Council, "Letter Dated 15 October 2025 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/2025/650 (October 15, 2025), pp. 2-3, 153-154. <https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/report/letter-dated-15-october-2025-from-the-panel-of-experts-on-yemen-addressed-to-the-president-of-the-security-council/n2523409.pdf>

³³ U.S. House of Representatives, Iran's Proxy in Yemen: The Houthi Threat to Middle East Stability, Global Shipping, and U.S. Service Members, 118th Congress (2024), p.4 <https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC73485/text>.

³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, "Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea," December 18, 2023, Department of Defense News Release, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/>

³⁵ Lloyd's List, "Map and List of Attacks," Lloyd's List, accessed April 5, 2026, <https://www.lloydslist.com/hot-topics/red-sea-risk/map-and-list-of-attacks>, Bridget Toomey, "Reciprocal Attacks between Houthis and Israel Continue," FDD's Long War Journal, September 15, 2025, <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/09/reciprocal-attacks-between-houthis-and-israel-continue.php>

and by the end of 2025, freight rates from Asia to Europe were still 80 percent higher than before the Houthi attacks began.³⁶

Toward the last days of 2025, Houthi activities had emerged as a testament to their ability to project influence through using their drone attacks. These continuous attacks on shipping lanes compromised navigational freedoms and exerted measurable strain on global commerce, increasing insurance costs and inflationary pressures on the Western states that the organisation sees as rivals.³⁷ The proliferation of this advanced weaponry to non-state actors, in that regard, functioned not only as a tool for supporting regional insurgency but also as a deliberate strategy to destabilize critical maritime zones, showing the evolving challenges of hybrid warfare in contemporary geopolitics. The attacks on maritime shipping continued in 2025 with limited international response to challenge or limit the terror organisations ability to inflict damage.³⁸ Today, with the growing crisis in the Middle East and expectations of further attacks by the Houthis, global powers appear ununited in their objectives, making it unlikely that they will be able to effectively counter such a threat to come.

The counter drone terrorism economy has been a challenging question for western military actors to find a solution for. As everything aside these drones have been an economic way to give damage to the US and its allies. While one Houthi or an Iranian suicide drone used by Iraqi militias can cost between around \$20,000 the US administration found itself spending way more to defend against these weapons as the air defence missiles US uses to take them down can cost up to \$2 Million.³⁹ Similarly the drones used by Hezbollah cost significantly less than the Israeli Iron Dome air defence systems that they use to take them down. This cost disparity brought these conflict and counter terrorism operations to an economic level showing how terrorist weapons can be used to damage the countries economies as well as causing a gradual reduction of defensive munitions stockpiles. The global powers failed to find ways to reduce this price disparity between the threat and the capabilities required to counter it effectively. The global responses against the ongoing Iranian hostilities will likely be the decisive path to see if there may be a change in the global response and strategy to challenge drone terrorism. Since the Iran conflict started Iran has been targeting American military bases, critical infrastructures, civilian buildings and maritime shipping in the Middle East using drones. These attacks have caused significant economic, strategic and personal damage which has caused many countries affected by these attacks to invest in drone detection and interception systems. This investment surge has also extended to Ukrainian firms,

³⁶ Coface UK, "Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: Why Maritime Trade Is Still Not Smooth Sailing," Coface UK – News, Economy and Insights, accessed April 5, 2026, <https://www.coface.uk/news-economy-and-insights/houthi-attacks-in-the-red-sea-why-maritime-trade-is-still-not-smooth-sailing#maritime-routes-under-pressure-the-suez-canal-losing-momentum>

³⁷ Joseph Haboush, "Why Has the US Military Campaign Failed to Stop Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea?" Al Arabiya English, January 15, 2025, <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2025/01/15/one-year-later-us-military-campaign-has-done-little-to-stop-houthi-attacks>.

³⁸ Al Jazeera, "Six Rescued, 15 Missing after Suspected Attack by Yemen's Houthis on Red Sea Vessel," July 9, 2025, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/9/five-rescued-after-suspected-attack-by-yemens-houthis-on-red-sea-vessel>, Al Jazeera, "Houthis Claim Retaliatory Attack on U.S. Ships," March 17, 2025, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/17/houthis-claim-retaliatory-attack-on-us-ships>. (aljazeera.com)

³⁹ Lara Seligman and Matt Berg, "A \$2M Missile vs. a \$2,000 Drone: Pentagon Worried over Cost of Houthi Attacks," POLITICO, December 19, 2023, <https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/19/missile-drone-pentagon-houthi-attacks-iran-00132480>.

which have been producing anti-drone systems for years and are considered reliable, battle-tested investments capable of countering this threat. This is particularly important as Iranian drone technology makes up a significant percentage of the arsenal of the terrorist organisations in the Middle East as Iran is the main supplier of weapons to most of these organisations. In that sense, if this boost to develop and invest on potential drone detection systems allow the rise of startups which can challenge Iranian drone attacks, these technologies and investments can also be used to challenge future drone attacks from terrorist organisations as well.